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ABSTRACT
Embedded systems permeate through nearly all aspects of
modern society. From cars to refrigerators to nuclear refiner-
ies, securing these systems has never been more important.
Intrusions, such as the Stuxnet malware which broke the
centrifuges in Iran’s Natanz refinery, can be catastrophic to
not only the infected systems, but even to the wellbeing of
the surrounding population. Modern day protection mech-
anisms for these embedded systems generally look only at
protecting the network layer, and those that try to discover
malware already existing on a system typically aren’t effi-
cient enough to run on a standalone embedded system. As
such, we present a novel way to ensure that no malware
has been inserted into an embedded system. We chaotically
randomize the entire memory space of the application, inter-
spersing watchdog-monitor programs throughout, to moni-
tor that the core application hasn’t been infiltrated. By val-
idating the original program through conventional methods
and creating a clean reset, we can ensure that any inserted
malware is purged from the system with minimal effect on
the given system. We also present a software prototype to
validate the possibility of this approach, but given the limi-
tations and vulnerabilities of the prototype, we also suggest
a hardware alternative to the system.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection
Keywords
Chaotic Memory Randomization, Code Injection, Intrusion
Detection, Embedded System Security
1. INTRODUCTION
Networked embedded and constrained devices (the so called
Internet of Things) now pervade almost every aspect of mod-
ern technologies. These devices range from household appli-
ances, such as refrigerators, to industrial machinery, such as
robotic arms used in factories. The need for protecting these
constrained devices has never been more important. A com-
promised microcontroller can be used for a myriad of malev-
olent activities including denial of service attacks, fraudulent
surveillance, and even the hijacking or destruction of poten-
tially dangerous machinery. In the industrial sector, a clear
example of the catastrophic consequences of a compromised
microcontroller is the event which occurred in Iran’s Natanz
nuclear refinery. In 2003, the refinery’s centrifuges were tar-
geted and destroyed by the Stuxnet virus [13]. The conse-
quences of a similar attack on a car, a functioning power
plant, or a military grade drone could be devastating to the
lives of thousands and could potentially disrupt the world
economy.
Even in the everyday lives of many people, compromised
devices can affect them without them even realizing it. An
example of the need for securing these IoT devices in house-
hold appliances is a botnet that Proofpoint researchers re-
cently discovered [20] with nearly 100,000 compromised con-
strained devices, including “smart appliances” such as re-
frigerators and televisions. The network of compromised
embedded systems sent out billions of spam emails per day,
without the owners of these devices even knowing that their
devices had been taken over. Though not physically harm-
ful, these sort of malicious activities can lead to larger elec-
tricity and data usage bills, and increases the computing
capacity of malicious botnets (which can in turn cause fur-
ther security breaches and unwanted impacts on people and
organizations).
While some steps have been taken to protect these types of
devices [18, 15, 6], many of these systems focus solely on
protecting the network connection layer. If code or a mali-
cious application is already loaded onto the machines, these
protection mechanisms become inadequate. This is particu-
larly relevant in highly secure closed-network facilities (such
as the Natanz refinery) where attack vectors may be loaded
via a simple USB key or the malware may be disguised in
such a way that it doesn’t present its functionality imme-
diately, avoiding detection. The Stuxnet virus for example,
lay dormant and masked its functionality by feeding previ-
ously recorded “normal” data to the safeguard applications
in place on the centrifuge micro-controllers [13].
Take for example a networked automotive microcontroller.
These controllers already have fault tolerant behavior which
can reset without affecting performance [14]. If a mali-
cious program is loaded onto an automotive microcontroller
without a driver’s knowledge, a potentially lethal situation
could occur where an attack vector lays dormant until high
speeds are reached and then turns off steering capabilities,
or worse. In this situation, knowing that a malicious pro-
gram has been loaded onto the microcontroller and resetting
the device from a clean authenticated image is much more
preferable to the alternative. As such, we present a “kernel”
or, in the future, a dedicated hardware unit, that can be used
to deeply randomize and execute a program to prevent this
very issue. We also present another addition to this Chaotic
Program Randomization which can alert an external source
of a possible intrusion.
2. TOWARD A SECURE EMBEDDED SYS-
TEM
The key issue we intend to address with our system is the
detection and removal of such malicious code from an em-
bedded system. This includes attacks ranging from code-
injection through buffer overflows to simple loading mecha-
nisms such as a USB key. With current program and mem-
ory structures there are few feedback mechanisms capable
of detecting whether code has been inserted into a normally
functioning application or if another application has been
loaded onto the controller or embedded system. The mech-
anisms that do exist, such as performance analysis-based
techniques, rarely are applicable to embedded solutions due
to size and performance constrains. While Cui et al. [6] try
a biologically inspired approach to interleave a “symbiote”
into existing operating systems, this approach still does not
guarantee protection for vulnerabilities or protect against
application layer insecurities such as the “Heartbleed” vul-
nerability [25].
We propose here the initial steps toward a secure “Oper-
ating Kernel”, which can not only verify that an applica-
tion is trusted before launching it, but also provide a ba-
sic level of memory encryption to protect against memory
exploitations at the application layer. We do so through
the chaotic randomization of the system’s program memory.
These same principles can be applied - with modifications -
to even secure server or personal computing operating sys-
tems. First, we present a software-based prototype of the
solution to show the feasibility of chaotically randomizing
the program memory space. This solution still contains vul-
nerabilities that can be exploited and has significant perfor-
mance setbacks. To remedy these problems, we then suggest
a hardware-assisted alternative which would effectively solve
the issues of the software only solution and allow for progress
toward an efficient and secure embedded system.
To address the key issue, we make the general assumption
that a program loaded onto the embedded system during a
boot is a trusted image of the application. This assumption
is made knowing that modern trusted computing techniques
are capable of secure verification in networked devices. Enck
et al. [9], for example, suggest a lightweight verification tech-
nique for mobile phones that, with modification, would be
applicable to this scenario and the ARM TrustZone technol-
ogy already does this to some degree [24]. The AEGIS IBM
architecture also is a similarly envisioned secure bootstrap-
ping mechanism for their operating system which would be
sufficient in completing this task [1]. Given this assumption,
we then attempt to address the issue of malicious code ei-
ther injected or loaded onto the embedded system through
various mechanisms, post-system startup.
Though Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is
a widely used deterrent from buffer overflow attacks in op-
erating systems, it has proven [21] that a determined at-
tacker could easily circumvent the defense offered. Even
fine-grained ASLR [11], a more refined randomization tech-
nique which randomizes not only applications in memory but
functions within the applications itself, has resulted in sys-
tems that can still be compromised through buffer overflow
attacks, albeit with much more complex attack systems [23].
According to NIST [17], buffer overflow attacks accounted
for 14.64% of vulnerabilities in 2013 despite the introduction
of fine-grained ASLR. Few other vulnerabilities came close
to this percentage. As such, protecting against these forms
of vulnerabilities remains an important gap that has yet to
be solved completely. Additionally, this form of randomiza-
tion, even done at the data level, still does little to protect
from exploitation of memory-based vulnerabilities, such as
the Heartbleed vulnerability in OpenSSL encryption[25].
Despite best efforts, attack vectors will be found in one form
or another in software. It is important to know when a
system has already been compromised, and to ensure that
such vulnerabilities will not affect the end-user significantly.
Since even something as simple as a new application being
uploaded from a USB key can be considered an attack vector
in closed network facilities - as in the probable initial intro-
duction of the Stuxnet malware [13] - we aim to determine
a method which could prevent any unintended application
from being loaded onto a micro-controller. As aforemen-
tioned, current malware detection mechanisms [10] are min-
imally effective in real time - particularly if the malware, as
in the Stuxnet virus, hides its activity or remains dormant -
and generally aren’t applicable to embedded systems, so we
stray away from typical detection models.
3. GENERAL SOLUTION OVERVIEW
To ensure that a rogue application cannot be loaded onto
a constrained device without discovery, we develop a sys-
tem inspired by the underlying randomization principle of
fine-grained ASLR [11]. In our scheme, we use a chaotic
randomization technique to scramble the program memory
at the instruction level, rather than the function or class
level. This not only allows for a minimal level of program
encryption, but also gives an opportunity to create a system
which can detect malicious code insertions.
The detection of the malicious insertions comes in the form
of a watcher-monitor system between the “kernel” and sev-
eral small “monitor” programs interleaved with the applica-
tion in memory. This system bares a loose resemblance to
Cui et al.’s symbiotic method for monitoring and protecting
against intrusions, and could even be used to carry out swift
counter attacks or protection measures other than a reset as
is described in [6].
3.1 Chaotic Memory Randomization
As aforementioned, the core of our secure system revolves
around the Chaotic Memory Randomization (CMR) system.
While ASLR provides random pads between applications
and even ASLP randomizes functions within a program, our
approach randomizes the entire program address space and
homogenizes the distribution (see Figure 1) on an assembly
instruction level. If multiple programs are loaded in mem-
ory, they are interleaved together, so that a conventional
Program Counter cannot step through either program and
any spy program or memory exploitation will be rendered
useless. This interleaving of programs not only becomes use-
ful for encrypting the program memory at a basic level, but
allows us to intersperse monitors throughout the other pro-
grams to alert us of malicious code insertion (as is discussed
later and presented in Figure 2). A chaotic decryption kernel
then feeds the proper instruction sequence to the program
counter to accurately step through the applications on the
desired embedded system.
Our initial method for randomization is based in Arnold’s
cat map. Though better chaotic randomization methods
may be developed, this method suits the purposes of CMR
and its simplicity is welcomed for smaller co-processors which
could be used in the hardware alternatives we later propose.
3.2 Arnold’s Cat Map
This particular chaotic encryption method was first used
by V. Arnold [2] for the purpose of image stenography and
encryption. Using simple matrix rules, shown in Eq. (1),
Arnold successfully showed that a reversible chaotic encryp-
tion was possible such that by iterating s times a completely
unrecognizable image was created, but it is possible to return
to the original image from a totally scrambled image by it-
erating another z times through Eq. (1) - or more simply by
multiplying the matrix to the k power. Internally within the
matrix, different values can be used in for p and q to further
enhance and differentiate the randomization process. For
the purposes of randomizing instructions, we assume this
system of chaotic encryption will be secure enough to avoid
backtracking. This assumption takes into account that an
attacker likely doesn’t know what the original image (or in-
struction sequence) should be. Even if the attacker did in
fact manage to learn the key, inserting an attack vector to
properly execute would still be extremely difficult without
causing a reset of the embedded device through the watch-
dog in the kernel.
3.3 Application of the Cat Map
For our purposes, we convert each instruction address to a
2-dimensional coordinate, apply the Arnold’s algorithm (see
Eq. (1)) and convert the address back to a 1-dimensional
space. This results in a mapping which can be used by
the decryption “kernel” previously mentioned. The kernel
is passed a key set (k, p, q) which is used to apply Arnold’s
cat map algorithm to find the real memory address of a
program instruction based on an internal virtual program
counter (VPC). Any jumps within the original application
update the internal VPC and calculate the real address in
the randomized memory.
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Figure 1: Randomization System
276314
276315
276316
276317
276318
276319
276320
276321
276322
276323
276324
Memory
Location
Address
Monitor 13
Application 125
nop
Application 37
Monitor 5
Application 119
Application 93
nop
Application 3
Monitor 22
Application 135
Watchdog-
Kernel
Figure 2: Kernel pinging watchdog
3.4 Monitor System
Several attempts [19, 3, 22, 6] have been made at creating
efficient monitoring devices for determining if malware has
been loaded onto an embedded system. Most, with the ex-
ception of Cui et al., of these systems involve either modeling
performance metrics of the embedded system and compar-
ing them against previous run times or theoretical run time
bounds. This is imprecise and often could be ineffective in
the case where the malware remains dormant or has built in
mechanisms for avoiding such detection. We instead focus
our attention on “tripwire”mechanisms which we refer to as
watcher-monitor programs.
To create this tripwire alert system with our chaotically en-
crypted memory solution, we interleave monitor programs
throughout the randomized application (as Cui et al. inter-
leave their symbiote). As seen in Figure 3a, in an unscram-
bled version of the assembly instructions, the application is
placed in linear sequence before a monitor. In the chaoti-
cally randomized memory, the monitor and application are
interspersed (Figure 3b). As presented in Figure 2, a watch-
dog program in the kernel pings various monitors interleaved
within application memory.
Provided that an acceptable, m, number of monitor pro-
grams are interleaved with the application, it becomes ex-
tremely difficult to insert a malicious program between ran-
a0 a1 a2 ... m0 m1 m2 m3
(a) Unscrambled and Separated Applica-
tion and Monitor
a0 m3 a13 ... m5 a6 m12 a35
(b) Scrambled and Interleaved
a0 m3 a13 ... v0 v1 v2 v3
(c) Attack vector insertion
Figure 3: Monitor System
domized monitor instructions without overwriting them. With
a proper randomization method which homogenizes the mem-
ory and spreads the instructions accurately, any insertion or
loading of an unauthorized program will overwrite a moni-
tor program instruction (see Figure 3c). When the watchdog
then pings a monitor which has been overwritten, the moni-
tor will fail to respond and the watchdog will be alerted of a
malicious program, causing a reset, alert, or counter-attack
mechanism to launch. A visualization of this can be seen in
Figure 2.
The method in which the watchdog “pings” these monitors
can be approached in several ways. For simplicity in the ini-
tial model, we suggest a simple privileged instruction which
periodically resets a validation register or value in the ker-
nel. The validation register would expire after several clock
cycles and trigger a ping to one of the monitor programs,
which would then reset the register within the kernel. In
the software solution, this is emulated by a register which
keeps track of this validation bit and is reset every x in-
struction executions. It then triggers a ping to a monitor
location, which resets the register to a valid position. This
solution clearly has vulnerabilities as the software-only solu-
tion generally does (for example if an attacker learned which
register is used for validation and was able to execute a priv-
ileged instruction to reset it). We later discuss a hardware
alternative to this pinging mechanism to address these vul-
nerabilities.
3.5 Trusted Application Loading
We assume a trusted application loading mechanism from
a clean image to reset after possible intrusions. Using a
mixture of methods similar to IBM’s AEGIS architecture
[1] and server-based authentication, we can assure that on
the kernel’s start, the loaded application is authentic and
untampered. IBM’s 4758 secure co-processor [8] also con-
tains several design principles that could be used to ensure
trusted loading mechanisms. In this architecture a factory
installed hardware-based authentication mechanism sends a
certification request to a server, at which point the code
is authenticated and loaded onto the device. Without this
authentication, code would not be loaded onto the device
memory and would be discarded. Upon successful authenti-
cation of a new (or initiating) program, we would randomize
the memory, with a fresh chaotic key, before it is placed in
RAM using the kernel and keep the needed keys to step
through the program.
4. COMMON ATTACKS AND
COUNTER MEASURES
To illustrate the protection properties of the developed sys-
tem, we look at some of the common attack vectors against
embedded systems and discuss how they’re thwarted by our
system.
4.1 Code Injection Attacks
Code injection attacks often exploit vulnerabilities in the
application layer to insert malicious code into the execution
path. This is also the main type of attack that our system
is designed to thwart. Any insertions into the embedded
systems program memory space through buffer overflows,
exploitation of double-free vulnerability, integer errors, and
the exploitation of format string vulnerabilities would result
in a monitor program or even the application being over-
written, triggering a reset or alert to be issued. All are
mechanisms for loading unsafe code onto the embedded sys-
tem. As we describe earlier, the monitor-watchdog system
we propose counters these types of attacks by pinging mon-
itors interleaved in the randomized memory space. If an
injection attack is attempted either the application itself or
a monitor somewhere in the homogenized memory space will
be overwritten, setting off a watchdog alert.
Though much more complex, this same principle can be ap-
plied to the data memory space to prevent insertion of data
and decrease the chances of data manipulation, but is not
discussed in this paper.
4.2 Side Channel Attacks
Side channel attacks are attacks which analyze various “side
channels” - such as power consumption of a chip [12] - in an
attempt to decipher an encryption key or acquire some other
information about the system. Though our system does not
necessarily thwart these types attacks, it is important to ad-
dress these attack vectors because they may be used to find
the encryption pattern in which the memory is scrambled.
Given that an attacker does in fact manage to successfully
use side channel attacks determine the randomization pat-
tern used in the embedded system, this information does
very little to help the attacker. Assuming a secure kernel
(as will be discussed in the hardware prototype), the at-
tacker must still overwrite the exact locations of subsequent
assembly instructions to ensure no monitors are overwritten
and the application does not freeze, alerting a watchdog.
This task is difficult with conventional code injection attacks
considering the amount of precision needed to complete it,
and is enough to thwart most, if not all side-channel based
attacks.
4.3 Memory Vulnerabilities (Heartbleed)
While not a direct intent of our model, when applied to
data memory, chaotic randomization adds a simple layer of
encryption to data memory. With our model in place, appli-
cation layer vulnerabilities (such as the Heartbleed vulnera-
bility) which expose data memory would not be as large of
a problem. If chunks of data memory were to be transferred
as occurred in Heartbleed, the attacker still would not be
able to acquire any useful information due to the scrambled
nature of the memory.
5. SOFTWARE PROTOTYPE
5.1 Introduction
For an initial solution, we use a prototype software-based
kernel on an 8-bit AVR microcontroller (Atmel 328p). The
purpose of the prototype was to determine if a program
could in fact be run successfully while remaining chaoti-
cally randomized at the assembly instruction level. The
kernel consists of several parts. An internal virtual program
counter (VPC) keeps track of the intended execution proce-
dure (i.e. how a typical Program Counter would function).
The three remaining parts of the kernel contain several func-
tions: a one time initialization of all necessary starting ad-
dresses, a section which calculates the next “real” assembly
instruction address in program memory based on the VPC,
and a section which updates the VPC based on jumps or
branches within the application. The application code was
preprocessed and pre-randomized before being merged with
the kernel hex file and loaded onto the microcontroller (or
emulator). The kernel itself, for the prototype, remained
unscrambled and in the 0x0000 region of memory, while
the scrambled application was placed in a higher location
in memory.
5.2 Application Preprocessing
The application assembly instructions had to be prepro-
cessed to ensure proper execution through the kernel. Each
instruction was interleaved with a jump back to the proper
location in the kernel, and nop instructions were added for
normalizing spacing in the program (to ensure the proper
calculation of memory addresses after scrambling the pro-
gram since AVR instructions can be of different lengths).
Such a set of instructions (the nop, jump back to the kernel,
and the application instruction) was considered to be a sin-
gle “instruction” for the purposes of calculating a memory
address in the randomized memory space. This following in-
structions set would thus be considered as one “instruction”
for calculating a real address in memory.
movw r22 , r18
jmp 0x01ec
nop ; padding f o r c a l c u l a t i o n
Sublabels were replaced with full-frame labels (i.e. 1: was
converted to .S1) and paired with the immediate following
instruction for randomization. As a result and instruction
sequence such as:
. L8 :
1 : brne 1b
would be converted to a sequence such as:
. L8 :
brne . L8
jmp 0x01ec
nop
This is because the local labels and jumps (i.e. 1b) would
be totally useless because of the instruction level randomiza-
tion of the program. Since full-frame labels were pair with
instructions, in this case a jump to .L8 would serve the same
purpose as 1b and would jump to the intended location even
in a randomized memory space. However, because we want
to keep track of and update the VPC in the kernel, uncondi-
tional jumps or branches within the program were replaced
with a set of instructions which pushed the intended label
address onto the stack, jumped to the part of the kernel
which updated the VPC, and then continued to the desired
label address. Conditional branches were replaced with a
branch sequence which either jumped to the normal part of
the kernel (V PC = V PC +1) if the condition was not met,
or would branch to slightly further in the sequence which
would put the intended label address onto the stack and
proceed as with unconditional jumps. A modified example
of this sequence can be seen as follows:
brne . L5
becomes:
brne .X1
jmp 0x01ec
.X1 :
l d i r28 , l o8 ( gs ( . L5 ) )
push r28
l d i r28 , h i8 ( gs ( . L5 ) )
push r28
jmp 0x02D4
Here, the intended branching address is .L5, which is re-
placed with a push onto the stack of the address to update
the VPC and jumping to the appropriate part of the kernel.
Otherwise, the operation continues on to the normal part of
the kernel which executes V PC = V PC + 1.
After preprocessing, the application was then randomized
(using a simple python script with Arnold’s Cat Map), linked
and then combined with the kernel through a hex merger.
The merged hex file was first loaded into an AVR simula-
tor to validate the execution order of the program. Upon
achieving correct execution, the program was loaded onto
the Arduino to ensure that the proper execution goal was
achieved. The successful running of the prototype solution
showed the viability of randomizing the program memory at
the instruction level while still achieving the desired execu-
tion.
5.3 Execution and Performance Impact
As expected, the software prototype has a significant perfor-
mance impact on the execution of even a simple program.
The memory impact is large due to the normalization of
assembly instruction sizes and the interspersion of jump in-
structions to return to the kernel. Additionally, performance
suffers due to the calculation of the next instruction’s mem-
ory location at every increment of the VPC as well as the
necessary jump back to the kernel to perform the calcula-
tions on the VPC.
5.4 Security Vulnerabilities
The software prototype is also vulnerable to attacks on the
kernel as it remains linear in execution. An attacker could
still modify the kernel or learn of the randomization pattern
and/or keys to break the functionality of the system. As
previously mentioned, we used the software-only prototype
as a basis for the hardware which we propose as follows to
ensure maximal security.
6. HARDWARE SOLUTION
With Chaotic Memory Randomization, it is extremely dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to create a software-only solution
which ensures total protection of the processing kernel and
application while still keeping performance impacts to a min-
imum. As such we propose a hardware alternative based on
the software model. The hardware-based solution lays its
roots in the foundations set forward by IBM’s 4758 Secure
Cryptoprocessor [8] and in Motorola’s very first Memory
Management Unit. [26] While the software loaded onto a
4758 Secure Cryptoprocessor has been arguably made vul-
nerable since its release [4, 5], its hardware and firmware,
remain unbreakable without extreme effort (if at all). As
such, we use this co-processor as a base for our proposed ar-
chitecture to ensure protection at the hardware and firmware
level. As a secure system is only as secure as its weakest link,
the goal of our hardware based solution, which we will re-
fer to generally as a Chaotic Security Coprocessor (CSC),
is to strengthen the security of applications on an embed-
ded system while keeping the CSC itself entirely secure. In
our hardware proposed solution, we also suggest the use of
a Chaotic Memory Unit for data memory reads, though this
will be discussed only briefly.
We have several aims in designing the hardware for our CSC
unit:
• Including an authenticated loading and randomization
mechanism
• Efficiently modifying the program counter to chaoti-
cally execute a randomized program.
• Implementing a secure watchdog-monitor system in a
secure hardware solution to prevent tampering
• Chaotically randomizing and mapping the data mem-
ory space through a Chaotic MMU
• Physically securing the hardware unit itself from tam-
pering, as the 4758 does
6.1 General Architecture
We propose a unit that can either be integrated into existing
CPU architectures or as an isolated unit outside of the pro-
cessor. To illustrate the proposed capabilities of the unit,
we will focus mainly on the latter. The unit is comprised of
several parts and generally sits between the CPU and fast-
access memory. The parts involved include: a loading unit,
a memory randomization unit, a random number generator
(which can be forgone in CPU integrated implementations in
favor of an existing random number generator located in the
CPU), small co-processor for address calculations, several
caches for mapping and pre-storage of upcoming addresses,
and a watchdog ROM.
6.2 Authenticated Loading, Randomization Unit,
and Random Number Generator
As with the IBM’s 4758 co-processor, we suggest an inte-
grated code-authentication and loading mechanism. In their
solution, Dyer et al., implement a trusted root with a “se-
curely generated root certificate” which can later be used
with a dedicated authentication unit to verify code before
it is loaded into executable memory. We suggest the use of
this same mechanism for our hardware implementation with
some modification.
The loading unit, authenticating in the same way as the 4758
co-processor, then generates a random chaotic encryption
and decryption key pair using an internal Pseudo-Random
Number Generator similar to the randomization system used
by FreeBSD (which further randomizes a hardware gener-
ated seed using Yarrow). The reason for not using a purely
hardware based random number generator is due to the built
in backdoors that are known to be exploited by government
agencies in Intel and Via Technologies hardware based ran-
dom number generators, which FreeBSD cited as its reason
for no longer relying solely on hardware based generators in
2013 [16, 7].
Generating a key pair, the loading part of the CSC then pro-
ceeds to chaotically randomize the program when loading it
into memory. In the same way that the program counter of
the system finds the next instruction to execute, the load-
ing mechanism finds the next addresses where to place in-
structions or data in memory based on the randomization
strategy and places this address on the bus for loading the
data. As in the software prototype, the CSC would stack
small monitor programs on top of the application before the
randomization process to ensure that the application was
sufficiently interlaced with security “tripwires”.
6.3 Co-Processor and Program Execution
The core of the chaotic processor is the execution strategy
for running a randomized program. This strategy uses the
internal co-processor to continuously calculate upcoming in-
struction addresses and store them in a fast cache according
to an internal program counter. In systems where minimal
impact to the existing architecture is desired, our CSC would
essentially replace the Program Counter. After being deliv-
ered a key from the loading mechanism, the CSC would then
begin to calculate upcoming memory addresses according to
an internal Program Counter (referred to from now on as the
VPC for consistency with the Software Prototype). These
addresses are stored in a fast cache to be fed to the CPU.
From here two approaches could be taken: one which mini-
mizes impact to existing architectures, or one which takes a
more consolidated approach. To see a visualization of both
approaches please see Figures 4 and 5.
6.3.1 Minimal Impact
In the minimal impact approach to existing architectures,
the CPU puts the address given by the CSC onto the bus,
retrieving the instruction to execute. For jumps or branches,
the CPU would place the “virtual” address on the bus con-
necting the CSC which would calculate the next logical ad-
dress and continue on. In this method, the CSC acts exactly
as a program counter would and the Chaotic Memory Unit
would interact with it to fetch the real memory address,
similar to a conventional MMU.
6.3.2 Consolidated Approach
Rather than allowing the CPU direct access to memory, in
this approach, the CSC wouldn’t even give the CPU any
memory addresses, it would simply feed the CPU instruc-
tions. Any memory requests would go through the CSC.
This would not only allow for fast pre-caching of instructions
in the CSC, but would also allow for extra security precau-
tions in the future (perhaps including analysis of suspicious
instruction sequences before execution would even occur).
In this scenario possible subsequent instruction paths for
both unconditional and conditional branches could be pre-
cached to lessen the impact of recalculating the upcoming
addresses. For data memory access in this scenario, we will
refer to the Chaotic Memory Unit section.
6.4 Internal Watchdog
As in the proposed general solution, a hardware based inter-
nal watchdog in the CSC would occasionally execute monitor
programs in the code to ensure that the application had not
been compromised. An unsuccessful execution of the moni-
tor would result in an exception being raised and the CSC
shutting down the current context, and relaunching the au-
thenticated loader. More specifically, the monitor could be
a privileged instruction which would set a “security” register
within the CSC. The security register would reset with x cy-
cles and trigger a monitor sampling. An example sampling,
which could be altered to increase security, could be a hash-
ing mechanism which is passed a key from the watchdog.
Upon hashing, the key hashed value would be verified and
reset the validation register in the CSC. If the register were
not set back to a valid state, the breach protocol would be
triggered. If successful the CSC would determine the loca-
tion of the next monitor to query and continue regular ex-
ecution. To ensure that the watchdog cannot be tampered
with, we place a small ROM with the watchdog executable
code on it inside the secure co-processor.
6.5 Chaotic Memory Unit (CMU)
To randomize the data memory space as well, we suggest
the use of a similar mechanism to commonplace MMUs, but
which instead use mappings provided through the secure co-
processor located on-board the CSC. The randomization of
data memory would be similar to that of program memory,
but would occur at an address space level, rather than at the
instruction level. This would also circumvent the need for
homogenizing the sizes of assembly instructions for address
calculations. As with CSC, we propose two solutions.
6.5.1 Minimal Impact
In an effort to preserve existing architectures we propose a
simple method in which the CPU places the desired memory
addresses on the bus to main memory. The CMU intercepts
this, uses the CSC to calculate the real address in main
memory and then places this on the outgoing bus. The
performance impacts of this are obvious as no pre-caching
could be done in this situation.
6.5.2 Consolidated Approach
In the consolidated approach, we combined the CSC with
the CMU to ensure that data memory addresses can be
pre-cached along with program addresses. The CSC would
interpret instructions beforehand and calculate the needed
memory addresses. Those addresses would be fetched and
cached before the CPU would even execute the instruction.
For example, in the sequence of instructions as follows, the
real address locations of OCR1 and OCR2 would have been
pre-calculated and pre-cached.
CPU
CSC
MicroProcessor
Computational Registers
Virtual PC
WatchDog ROM
Instruction Cache
Memory Lookup Table
Key Registers
Chaotic MMU Data Memory
Figure 4: Hardware Overview: CSC and CMU in Minimal
Impact Setting
CPU
CSC
MicroProcessor
Computational Registers
Virtual PC
WatchDog ROM
Instruction Cache
Memory Lookup Table
Key Registers
Chaotic MMU
Memory
Figure 5: Hardware Overview: CSC and CMU in Consoli-
dated Setting
l d i temp2 , 0
s t s OCR 1, temp2
l d i temp2 , 1
s t s OCR 2, temp2
In this way, when the CPU executes the sts command, it
places OCR1 on the address lines to the consolidated CSC/CMU.
The CSC/CMU then places the real address on the address
lines to main memory from its cache.
6.6 Physical securing of the CSC
To protect the hardware itself, we suggest similar mecha-
nisms as in the 4758 cryptoprocessor architecture. In their
hardware solution, ratchet locks protect the sensitive mem-
ories (containing secret keys) which zero the coprocessor
memory without requiring software intervention on any de-
tected tampering (including “temperature extremes, voltage
variation, and radiation”) [8]. Since our co-processor does
not require any access from the outside world to the pro-
cessor itself other than inputting a desired logical memory
address and outputting the real memory location (and ini-
tial authentication of the code base), we are able to use the
same tamper prevention techniques to completely lock the
co-processor. Using battery-backed RAM, one can ensure
that the RAM is erased if tampering is detected and that
any access results in the zeroing of any secrets which can
only be initiated on a total reset of the hardware system (as
in the 4758).
7. APPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
While there remains much to be done with the Chaotic Ran-
domization model presented, we set forth an example of
what can and needs to be accomplished in rethinking embed-
ded architectures. With the increasing prevalence of embed-
ded systems and the evolving skill and advanced training of
malicious attackers, a restructuring of modern day embed-
ded architectures should be sought after to shift mindsets
toward securing these systems. While many attacks and er-
rors still occur at the application layer due to the fault of
the application programmers, the underlying hardware and
memory architectures should do as much as possible to pre-
vent against a catastrophic vulnerability. Chaotic Memory
Randomization as a software-only approach cannot and will
not totally prevent attacks, yet we demonstrate the possi-
bility of using a totally randomized memory space to suc-
cessfully execute a program. By keeping security in mind
during hardware and chip design processes, steps toward a
CSC or something of a similar nature can be taken to ensure
that the embedded systems of tomorrow can prevent and de-
tect the insertion of malicious code or alert administrators
of malicious activity.
Major applications for such a security co-processor could
include secure telecommunications devices that can protect
against malware (including keyloggers or wiretaps), autonomous
robotics processors which can prevent against “rogue” code
from being executed, and power plants or other infrastruc-
ture facilities among many others. Though our system as
described can be applied to many different areas, the fo-
cus and where it is most effective is in secure facilities such
as the Natanz refinery, where key infrastructure includes
many embedded systems that should only run one trusted
application. In the case of the Natanz refinery, having the
CSC on board the centrifuges could have triggered alarms
when the Stuxnet virus was loaded onto the machines and
prevented the destruction of refinery equipment. To pre-
vent future such intrusions, particularly in fully functioning
nuclear reactors, the development and implementation of a
security-centric processing unit, like the CSC, is absolutely
necessary.
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